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NOTES
IMPORTANT VICTORY WON
FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-HISTORIC PRESERVATION: The
United States Supreme Court upholds New York City's Landmarks
Preservation Law as applied to the Penn Central Transportation
Company, thus denying the construction of an office tower over
Grand Central Terminal. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 98 S.Ct. 2646 (1978).
As early as 1906, with the passage of the Antiquities Preservation

Act,' Congress expressed its concern for historic landmarks and
structures. The Act gave the President the authority to designate as
national monuments, landmarks, structures, and other objects of historic interest on lands owned or controlled by the government.
In 1935 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt encouraged the
passage of additional, more powerful legislation:
I wish to make known my deep interest in the Antiquities Act,

the general purpose of which is to enable the Federal Government,
with the cooperation of the States and other public and private
agencies, to lay a broad legal foundation for, and to develop and
carry on, a national program for the preservation and interpretation

of the physical and cultural remains of our history.
At the present time when so many priceless historical buildings,
sites, and remains are in grave danger of destruction through the
natural progress of modern industrial conditions, the necessity for
this legislation becomes apparent. 2
Harold L. Ickes, then Secretary of the Interior, expressed similar
concern in his reports to the House and Senate, 3 and this interest
culminated in Congress passing the Historic Sites, Buildings, and
Antiquities Act of 1935.' This Act required the Secretary of the

Interior to make a survey of historic sites, buildings and objects for
1. Antiquities Preservation Act of
seq. (1976)).
2. H.R. REP. NO. 848, 74th Cong.
Sess. 2 (1935).
3. H.R. REP. NO. 848, 74th Cong.
Sess. 2 (1935).
4. Historic Sites, Buildings, Objects

at 16 U.S.C. §461 etseq. (1976)).

1906, 34 Stat. 225, (codified at 16 U.S.C. §431 et
1st Sess. 2 (1935); S. REP. NO. 828, 74th Cong. 1st
1st Sess. 2 (1935); S. REP. NO. 828, 74th Cong. 1st
and Antiquities Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 666 (codified
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the purpose of determining which possessed exceptional value in
light of the history of the United States. The Secretary was further
charged with restoring, and maintaining such properties either
through acquisition by the United States or by cooperative arrangement with states, municipalities, corporations, associations and
individuals.'
By 1966 Congress had become aware of the need to expand the
1935 Antiquities Act, which addressed itself only to properties determined to be "nationally significant." 6 In its report the House found
that a limited number of properties met this criteria, while many
others, worthy of protection because of their historical, cultural, or
architectural significance in their communities, had little or no protection.' The White House too felt the need for further legislation as
expressed in a letter to the Senate from Lady Bird Johnson:
We must preserve and we must preserve wisely. As the report
emphasizes, in its best sense preservation does not merely mean the

setting aside of thousands of old buildings as museum pieces. It
means retaining the culturally valuable structures as useful objects, a
home in which human beings live, a building in the service of some
commercial or community purpose. Such preservation insures structural integrity, relates the preserved object to the life of the people
around it, and not least, it makes preservation
a source of positive
8
financial gain rather than another expense.

With such favorable backing, Congress passed the National Historic
Preservation Act of 1966.' The Senate viewed the Act as "a fresh
beginning in the continuing effort to turn the tide in favor of historic
preservation."' 0 It provided for a greatly expanded national register,
for grants to the states to conduct statewide historic surveys and
prepare preservation plans, and for grants to the states and the
National Trust for Historic Preservation to aid in preservation. The
Act also established a National Advisory Council on Historic Preservation to advise the President, Congress and Federal Agencies on
matters of historic preservation. 1
The same climate of concern for historic preservation which led to
5. Id. §462.
6. Id. §461.

7. H.R. REP. NO. 1916, 89th Cong. 2nd Sess. 3 (1966), reprintedin [19661 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3306, 3310.
8. 112 CONG. REC. 15167 (1966).

9. National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. §470(b) et seq. (1976).
The Congressional Record shows that no roll call vote was taken in either house on this
bill, and it apparently passed both houses unanimously.
10. S. REP. NO. 1363, 89th Cong. 2nd Sess. 6 (1966).
11. National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. § 470(a), § 470(i) (1976).
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the passage of the Historic Preservation Act had resulted in every
state enacting some form of legislation to protect historic buildings
and sites by 1965.1 2 In addition many cities, towns, and counties
had individually acted to preserve historic buildings and sites.' 3
A typical example of such action was New York City's Landmarks
Preservation Law of 1965,' 1 enacted for the purpose of establishing
a city-wide program for the identification and preservation of historic structures and sites. The Act set up a commission which identifies possible historic landmark structures and sites and may
designate them as such after a public hearing.' I As part of the program outlined in this law the Landmarks Preservation Commission of
the City of New York designated Grand Central Terminal as a landmark and landmark site respectively.' 6 This designation barred any
construction or alteration of the terminal's exterior appearance without the approval of the Landmarks Commission.' I It is interesting to
note that Penn Central Transportation Company, which owns Grand
Central, did not seek judicial review of this designation when it was
made,' 8 and yet it was this designation which caused Penn Central
to later sue the City of New York.
In 1968 Penn Central submitted two plans for construction of an
office tower over the terminal to the Landmarks Commission,'
both of which were rejected. 2 0 In its report the Commission stated
that it
[h] as no fixed rule against making additions to designated buildings-it all depends on how they are done. . .. But to balance a
55-story office tower above a flamboyant Beaux-Arts facade seems
nothing more than an aesthetic joke. 2
Having no further administrative remedies, because the terminal
already enjoyed the partial real estate tax exemptions given to railroads under New York law,2 2 Penn Central instituted proceedings.
They asked for equitable relief, as well as money damages, on the
12. J. MORRISON, HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW, 61 passim (Supp. 1972).

13. Id
14. N.Y.C. Landmarks Preservation Law, N.Y.C. Charter and Administrative Code h. 8-A
205-1.0 et seq. (1976).
15. Id The 11 member Landmarks Preservation Commission includes at least three
architects, one qualified historian, one realtor, and one city planner or landscape architect.
377 N.Y.S. 2d at 25 (1975).
16. 50 App. Div. 2d at-,

17. 98 S.Ct. at 2649 (1978).
18. Id. at 2649.
19. Both plans were designed by Marcel Breuer and involved towers over the building of
55 and 53 stories.

20. 98 S.Ct. at 2655 (1978).
21. Id at 2656.
22. See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX 489-aa et seq. (McKinney Supp. 1978).
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grounds that the Commission's actions constituted a taking of private
property without just compensation in violation of due process and

equal protection of the law. The trial term of the New York Supreme
Court agreed and declared the Landmarks Law as applied to Grand

Central unconstitutional. 2 3
The City of New York and the Landmarks Commission appealed 24 and the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
Court reversed, finding the Landmarks Law constitutional. 2 1 The
Court further stated that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that the
Landmarks Law as applied to them constituted a taking. 2 6 The
standard the court used was that the regulation must deprive the
petitioner of all reasonable beneficial use of its property, 2 and not
that it deprives the property of its most beneficial use. 2 8 Further the
court found that Penn Central had imputed a considerable amount of
railroad operating expenses to their terminal real estate operations,
and thus did not show a lack of reasonable return. 2 9
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, 3 holding that while

often in landmark regulation a single owner must bear the burden of
limitation, making it similar to discriminatory zoning, it is not unconstitutional if there is an acceptable ieason for less favorable treatment. 3 ' If the reason is cultural, architectural, historical, or due to
the social significance of the property, the standard to be applied is
reasonable return on the property. 3 2 Penn Central had failed to

establish lack of reasonable return.3 ' Further the court thought that
Penn Central's assertion of an unconstitutional taking by the state
showed impropriety, because much of the present value of Grand
Central could be imputed to substantial government investment in
3
it. 4

The United States Supreme Court also affirmed, 3

although they

found that implementation of New York City's law did place certain
23. 50 App. Div. 2d at -, 377 N.Y.S. 2d at 22.
24. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of N.Y., 50 App. Div. 2d 265, 377 N.Y.S. 2d
20 (1975).
25. Id. at..,
377 N.Y.S. 2d at 30.
26. Id. at
, 377 N.Y.S. 2d at 28.
27. Williams v. Town of Oyster Bay, 32 N.Y. 2d 78, 295 N.E. 2d 788, 343 N.Y.S. 2d 118
(1973).
28. Goldblatt v. Town Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
29. 50 App. Div. 2d at -, 277 N.Y.S. 2d at 28.
30. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y. 2d 324, 366 N.E. 2d 1271,
397 N.Y.S. 2d 914 (1977).
31. Id. at
., 366 N.E. 2d at 1274, 397 N.Y.S. 2d at 918 (1977).
32. Id. at
, 366 N.E. 2d at 1275, 397 N.Y.S. 2d at 918 (1977).
33. Id. at
, 366 N.E. 2d at 1277, 397 N.Y.S. 2d at 920 (1977).
34. Id. at
, 366 N.E. 2d at 1276, 397 N.Y.S. 2d at 919 (1977).
35. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 98 S.Ct. 2646 (1978).
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restrictions on the use of the terminal. But these restrictions were
found to be a feature necessary to the attainment of the larger goals
of the law which still insured the owners of a reasonable return on
their property.3 6 Further the air rights over Grand Central were not
lost to Penn Central because they were able to transfer these rights to
adjoining properties. 3
In fact, New York City's Transfer of
Development Rights 3 8 zoning regulations were amended in 1969
primarily for the benefit of Penn Central and the amended regulations extended the transfer possibilities to an even greater area.3 9
The Supreme Court dealt only with what it considered to be the
issue; namely, whether or not the application of New York City's
Landmarks Preservation Law had taken Penn Central's property in
violation of the 5th and 14th amendments. 4 0 The Court did not deal
with related issues not contested by Penn Central such as whether
"states and cities may enact land use restriction that enhances the
quality of life by preserving the character and desirable aesthetic
features.of a city;"' I whether "preserving structures and areas with
specific historic, architectural or cultural significance is an entirely
permissible governmental goal;" 4 2 whether the restrictions imposed
on the terminal were an appropriate means of attaining these
goals; 4 or whether the fact findings of the Appeals Court that
Grand Central in its present state is capable of earning a reasonable
return were correct.4 4

The question of what constitutes an unconstitutional taking of
property by a state has been considered previously by the Supreme
Court. In Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 4 1 it held that as long as a
local ordinance has a relationship to health, safety, public convenience, public comfort, public prosperity, or general welfare it is
not unconstitutional per se.4 6 However, if the ordinance imposes
such restrictions that the property is not capable of a reasonable
36. Id. at 2664.
37. Id at 2666.
38. In New York City development rights (air rights) go with all property. These are
limited by formulas enumerated in the zoning code. For historic properties, on which the
development rights may not be used, the owner of the property may transfer the rights to
other of his properties with certain restrictions.
39. Marcus, Air Rights Transfers in New York City, 36 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB.
372, 375 (1971).
40. 98 S.Ct. at 2651 (1978).
41. Id at 2662.
42. Id. at 2662.
43. Id. at 2662.
44. Id. at 2662.
45. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
46. Id at 395.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 19

use* 7 or a beneficial use,4 8 then the ordinance is unconstitutional as
applied to that property. Goldblatt and Euclid specifically held that
the property need not be accorded the most beneficial use; any
beneficial use is sufficient to sustain constitutionality. 4 9
The New York Courts had previously dealt with cases involving
the designation of buildings as historic landmarks by the New York
City Landmarks Commission. In all of these it applied the standards
set out by the United States Supreme Court in Goldblatt and Euclid.
In Manhattan Club v. Landmarks Preservation Commission of City
of New York' 0 petitioner asked that the designation of its
building as a landmark be annulled as an unconstitutional taking.
The petition was denied because the Club was free to remodel the
interior as it pleased and had not shown an inability to earn a reasonable return on the building. Later when the Club showed that it was
unable to reasonably use the building, and neither the Club nor the
Landmarks Commission could find a buyer, the building was permitted to be demolished so that the land could be used for other
purposes.'

1

Trustees of Sailors Snug Harbor v. Platt' 2 held that the designation of the buildings involved was proper. The case was remanded,
however, for determination as to whether or not maintenance of the
property interfered either physically or financially with the carrying
out of the Trustee's charitable purposes-providing housing for aged
seamen-and thus constituted an unconstitutional taking. The court
equated this test with the reasonable use test applied to commercial
property.5 s
In Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York 4 the court
found a designation to exceed the limits of zoning power. The building was totally inadequate for the plaintiffs' needs and the Landmark
designation so interfered with the plaintiffs' ability to freely and
economically use the property as to constitute an unconstitutional
taking."
The Supreme Court's Penn Central holding followed the reasoning
of these three cases and applied the standards set out in Goldblatt
47. Id. at 397.
48. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
49. Id. at 592, 272 U.S. at 397.
50. 51 Misc. 2d 556, 273 N.Y.S. 2d 848 (1966).
51. Rankin, Operation & Interpretation of the New York City Landmarks Preservation
Law, 36 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 366, 371 (1971).
52. 29 App. Div. 2d 376, 288 N.Y.S. 2d 314 (1968).
53. Id at 378, 288 N.Y.S. 2d at 316.
54. 35 N.Y. 2d 121, 316 N.E. 2d 305, 359 N.Y.S. 2d 7 (1974).
55. Id at 128, N.E. 2d at 312, 359 N.Y.S. 2d at 14 (1974).
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and Euclid. Penn Central did not prove that they could not earn a
reasonable return on Grand Central, and thus the Court could not
find an unconstitutional taking and still follow precedent. Had Penn
Central shown the inability to earn a reasonable return, the result
would undoubtedly have been different.
The Supreme Court's affirmation of historic preservation legislation and the standard of reasonable use as applied to properties is an
important victory for historic conservation which is "but one aspect
of the much larger problem, basically an environmental one, of enhancing-or perhaps developing for the first time-the quality of life
for people." ' 6 The Supreme Court has shown that our historical
environment is a valid consideration in zoning. Historic preservation
laws will not be held to be unconstitutional per se. The laws can only
be unconstitutional as applied, if the application deprives the owner
of a reasonable return on the property. As long as the return is
reasonable it need not be the best possible return.
ALEXANDRA Z AVELLE LEVINE

56. Gilbert, Precedents for the Future, 36 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 311, 312
(1971) (Quoting address by Robert Stipe, Conference on Preservation Law, Washington,
D.C. unpublished text 6-7, May 1, 1971).

